Robert L. Grenier's 88
Days to Kandahar (Simon &
Schuster, 2015, 465 pages, $28.00/14.99) reads like two
different books. When he's writing about the internal politics of the
CIA, its relationships, internal rivalries, and policy debates within
the vast U.S. Governmental establishment, the book reads like a
political thriller, an exciting and engaging novel. However, he seems
to delight in going deep into the mind numbing weeds of
unpronounceable and unmemorable names of people and places that just
won't stay in place in my mind. While both elements are important, it
would appear that Grenier has two audiences in mind. The first is a
general reader seeking to understand more fully the intricacies and
ongoing importance of our engagement in Afghanistan during the late
Clinton, Bush, and early Obama administrations. The second book seems
to be more aimed at either a middle-east specialist or the kind of
political junky who delights in finding error, or even hidden plots,
in the minutia of the cloud of war. As a single volume, while at
times terrifically engaging, the book is too long by at least a third
for the general reader.
As a career CIA officer in the
clandestine service, as Station Chief in Islamabad, Pakistan, and as
director of Counter Terrorism Center, Grenier's perspective is one
of recognizing the seams and stresses within an essentially tribal
society and understanding the culture in such a way as to provide
support for moving toward rational and effective self government.
I've never read anything else that places Afghanistan and Pakistan in
such a clear picture of the forces effecting the decisions and
actions they take. This is particularly true in the rugged border
territories called the Tribal Areas. The Taliban, particularly, is
placed within a rational context of providing a counterweight for the
unbridled greed and graft of the war lords in the tribal areas. As
such, from their narrow, fundamentalist perspective, the Taliban
often emerge as a force for good government and rationality, as men
who operate out of a religiously motivated self-interest. They can be
dealt with, but only within the context of subtle pressure to move in
a more useful direction. Thus the cultural sensitivity and low
profile are posited as moving in positively for the area. And then
came September 11, 2001 turning the United States into a country
driven my panicked populace and government seeking rapid, blunt
hammer responses.
Much of the remainder of the book
describes the internecine struggles between the political, military,
and intelligence branches to achieve a victory which would include
the elimination of Osama bin Laden and the destruction of Al Qaeda
within a context of efforts to place politician/warlord Hamid Karzai
in power, despite his all-to-obvious problems, because he appeared to
be a pro-western alternative. During an 88 day period, Karzai moves
towards Kandahar, Afghanistan's capital, with strong U.S. military,
intelligence, and diplomatic support where he becomes the president
of a still badly fractured Afghanistan, whose fortunes have vastly
improved as American resources are focused on rooting out bin Laden
hiding in the tribal areas. Grenier's posture is that if the US
government would only leave matters to the pros, ire. the CIA,
matters could be worked out. However, the bureaucratic infighting
between branches of government and elements within the CIA itself
make this impossible, creating chaos and the ultimate destruction of
Afghan society as well as the radicalization of Pakistan's
government, caught between American aggression to their west and
Indian opposition to their east. When Grenier is writing about ther
power struggles and clandestine operations, he is at his best,
writing taught, driving prose that reads like a novel. Sadly, he
sometimes gets lost in the weeds of too many names and places. I
found that an occasional look at Google maps was helpful in getting a
clearer picture of the geography involved.
Robert L. Grenier
Robert L. Grenier had a much decorated,
twenty-seven-year career in the CIA’s clandestine service. A
renowned Middle East expert, he has been deputy national intelligence
officer for the Near East and South Asia. He organized the CIA’s
Counter-Proliferation Division and headed the CIA’s basic training
facility, “The Farm.” From 1999 to 2002, he was CIA station chief
in Islamabad. Subsequently, he was director of the CIA’s Counter
terrorism Center, responsible for all CIA counter terrorism
operations around the globe. Currently, Grenier is chairman of ERG
Partners, a consulting firm to businesses in the intelligence and
security sector. (Publisher's Author Profile)
In 88
Days to Kandahar (Simon &
Schuster, 2015, 465 pages, $28.00/14.99) has contributed a very
useful addition to the literature of the middle east, serving to
increase the understanding of the reader to the complexities of
social, religious, and political nuances and forces in the region. He
engages in a good deal of score settling with members of the George
W. Bush administration, with particular ire aimed at Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Vice President Dick Cheney, and CIA Director
Porter Goss, viewing military intervention as most useful when it is
limited and focused. Grenier neglects to write about his eventual
firing by CIA Director Porter Goss after his testimony in the CIA
leak case and the Scooter Libby leaking trial. This flaw compromises
some of the excellent observations he makes throughout the book.
Whether it fully compromises the book I leave to the reader to
decide. On balance, I found the book both interesting and
informative, but needing to be read in context to obtain a fuller
understanding. I read 88
Days to Kandahar in an
electronic galley provided to me by the publisher through Edelweiss
on my Kindle app.
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