David Rohde, a distinguished journalist
who has covered the Middle East extensively, has written a book
examining US policy and behavior in the Middle East with a particular
emphasis on post 9/11 activity. In Beyond War: ReimaginingAmerican Influence in a New Middle East
(Viking, 2013, 240 Pages, $27.95) David Rohde explores the
systematic failures of policy in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan
which have led to worsening relations in the Middle East. He
concentrates on the extensive reliance on employing military
contractors to undertake activities which should be dealt with by the
military, intelligence, and diplomatic arms of the government, but
which have become relied upon because of reduced funding and the
difficulty of responding to specific needs posed by the arcane hiring
practices in today's underfunded government. The examples he presents
are chilling in their depiction of the devolution of U.S. influence
where success would have been achievable under different
circumstances.
Military and diplomatic decision making
during the G.W. Bush administration by the neo-cons influencing the
President hampered military and civilian agencies from achieving
their goals. Rohde's on-the-spot observation and interviews leave a
feeling of the difficulties experienced by Americans on the scene,
especially concerning our support of corrupt officials and reliance
upon authoritarian and military solutions requiring long-term
diplomatic negotiation, listening, responsiveness, and cultural
respect rather than abrupt American action.
Rohde details ways the process of
hiring contractors wastes money, reduces trust, weakens U.S. Policy
efforts, and undercuts the direct efforts of government agencies. He
describes how the contractors' profit motive led too much money to
return to the U.S. while too few operational personnel were on site
to achieve the difficult goals of nation building. Contracts are let
on a “cost +” basis insuring that the corporations owning them
make profits regardless of outcomes. Companies like Dyn Corp were
referred to as “body shops,” because they provided bodies to fill
slots without regard to experience or background and often based on
political considerations of the Bush administration's
neo-conservative leadership, undercutting goals established as
policy. He says, “In the end, Dyn Corp and other contractors had
little responsibility for actual outcomes of US government efforts
but continued to profit enormously.” Essentially, these contractors
had the “government's credit card in their pocket.”
When Barack Obama became President, he
appointed Richard Holbrooke as special envoy to Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Holbrooke accomplished much in improving matters by
redirecting contractors and improving outcomes before working himself
to death in 2010. However, Holbrooke's abrasiveness, driving style,
and work ethic was a mixed blessing to Secretary of State Hilary
Clinton and Obama. It also turns out that the difficulty of achieving
US goals lies beyond partisan politics, but more in the government
structure and interagency in-fighting at home and in the field. For
instance, the efforts of USAID, staffed by long-term professionals
with in-country experience, local language skills, and cultural
sensitivity were undercut by Congress and other agencies. Rohde
points out that building on-the-ground relationships requires time,
patience, and understanding. None of these qualities characterize US
efforts, which are often short term and politically driven. He also
takes a look at the drone program which he says has proven to be
neither reliable nor accurate.
In Part II, called “A Way Forward,”
Rohde considers the ways in which Islam, Democracy, modernism, and
capitalism can co-exist in a contemporary society. He uses the
examples of Prime Minister Erdogan in Turkey, the leader in Tunisia,
and the current tensions and uproar in Egypt as examples, seeing much
of the current disruption as part of the revolutions of rising
expectation within the Arab world. In each he sees the promise and
peril of democracy to Islam. Perhaps, above all, he calls for showing
respect for decisions made in a democratic fashion, regardless of
whether the decisions themselves are ones which fit with US policy.
He points out that we are perceived in the Arab world as having been
in support of autocratic dictators for generations and are now
reaping the results of that support. Meanwhile, a strong
entrepreneurial spirit among the huge cohort of Muslim youth in the
Middle East is going almost unnoticed. The education of women is
proceeding at a hitherto unrecognized pace, and the economies, where
they're working, are hi tech and media driven. He quotes Turkish
moderates as arguing that the strongest weapons against militant
Islam are “engagement, investment, and technology.” This is best
accomplished through private-public partnerships involving businesses
and USAID. He says that private sector investment supporting
indigenous start-up companies is more valuable to nation building
than large scale government development aide.
In discussing the tragic death of
Ambassador Chris Stevens at the Benghazi legation in Libya, Rohde
places it within the context of the country itself and the emerging
US pollicy of limited engagement. Because the Libyans had
specifically barred security contractors and US resources have been
stretched to the breaking point through Congressional withholding of
funds, he suggests the Benghazi incident may have been an inevitable
outcome in an emerging moderate country. He says that
Ambassador Stevens opened doors and we
should follow his example.
Similarly, in Egypt we face the
consequences of forty years of having backed military dictators to
the tune of over forty billion dollars, much of which went to create
and maintain a corrupt military system of payoffs, nepotism, and
favoritism which resulted in the destruction of the middle class and
the neglect of education and business enterprises. The now ruling
Muslim Brotherhood emerged as a counterweight to military corruption
where a literate, entrepreneurial, middle class had, at best, been
discouraged. The Muslim Brotherhood has become a model for Erdogen in
Turkey, Ennahda in Tunisia, and Hamas in Palestine in providing
health services and education for the poor where the ruling
government did not do so, being propped up by the US government.
The issue of large, high profile
development projects like dams, roads, and electricity versus
smaller, locally needed and requested projects remains a major one.
USAID and local NGO's represent the smaller approach, while US policy
is often oriented to supporting the interests of congressional
members' constituents through grants and programs requiring
purchases from companies in their districts rather than encouraging
and facilitating the efforts of local businesses. Through introducing
individual USAID officers and local entrepreneurs and telling their
stories, Rohde makes a strong case for encouraging local efforts
through encouragement and funding. He comments that taking risks is
part of the culture of business, while avoiding risk, and the
attendant publicity of the media and Congress has become
characteristic of US policy efforts. He describes government workers
as smart and able people beaten down by constant changes of policy
and lack of support. The seeding the government agencies with right
wing ideologues during the eight years of the Bush neo-con ascendancy
also led to a large cadre of civil service protected employees
dedicated to undermining programs and policies of the new
administration from within. Politics always trumps policy.
David Rohde
Beyond War: Reimagining American Influence in a New Middle East
(Viking, 2013, 240 Pages, $27.95) by David Rohde who
has
born closer witness to the debacle of the American experiences in
Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan than most other observers —a former
foreign correspondent for The
New
York Times
for fifteen years, eight spent in Afghanistan and Pakistan—where he
was held captive by the Taliban for seven months.
David Rohde is currently a columnist for Reuters and the Atlantic. His work is also published in the International Herald Tribune. He is a two-time winner of the Pulitzer Prize and the author, with Kristen Mulvihill, of A Rope and a Prayer: A Kidnapping from Two Sides and Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica. He lives with his family in New York City. Because of his captivity in Pakistan, he has not recently returned to the Middle East, but has relied on his extensive sources there to help in fill in necessary details. This book is essential reading for both policy makers and those interested in the dilemmas we face in the Middle East. It is written in a clear, incisive, and impassioned style that's persuasive without being ideological. I read Beyond War on my Kindle in galley form provided by the publisher through NetGalley.
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